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Timed Out of Title VII Claims: Which Party
Should Bear the Burden of Showing
Compliance with Title VII Timing
Requirements?
Viviana Aldoust
INTRODUCTION
More than 2,000 lawsuits with Title VIII claims were filed
between 2004 and 2013.2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or
job applicants on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 3 The statute's protections extend to recruiting,
hiring, advancement, work environment, compensation,
classification of employees, and retaliation.4
Before filing a Title VII lawsuit for alleged employment
discrimination, a complainant must first file a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
federal agency that interprets and enforces Title VII.5 The
complainant may only file a Title VII lawsuit after receiving
notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue. 6 The EEOC
enforces strict rules regarding when a complainant must fulfill
certain requirements before filing a Title VII lawsuit, including
t BA 2012, The University of Texas at Austin; JD Candidate 2015, The University
of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Emily Buss for providing valuable
insights and guidance, which helped make this Comment possible.
1 See 42 USC § 2000e et seq.
2 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Litigation Statistics,
online at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/itigation.cfm (visited Oct 18,
2014).
' 42 USC § 2000e-2.
4 42 USC §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3.
42 USC §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5.
6 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Filing a Lawsuit, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (visited Oct 18,
2014).
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filing a charge with the EEOC or, if the complainant is alleging
a claim against a federal agency, with the agency itself.7
Several federal courts have addressed Title VII timing
requirements for filing employment discrimination lawsuits.
However, the courts have not yet adopted a uniform approach to
the role of the requirements. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
as well as district courts in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
determined that the plaintiff must prove that he or she complied
with the timing requirements in order to successfully pursue a
Title VII lawsuit in a federal district court.8 On the other hand,
the DC, First, Ninth, and Second Circuits have determined that
the plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements creates an
affirmative defense that could lead to dismissal of the lawsuit if
the defendant establishes the plaintiff's failure to comply.9
The decision to place the burden on one party as opposed to
the other can have significant implications. When plaintiffs bear
the burden of proof, they must plead compliance with the timing
requirements and furnish proof thereof if the defendant contests
the issue. 10 When defendants bear the burden of proof, they
must raise the defense of plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
timing requirements at the pleading stage." If defendants fail to
plead the defense, they risk waiver and may not be able to
assert the defense later.12 This Comment argues that the Title
VII deadlines are essentially statutes of limitations and should
thus create affirmative defenses when plaintiffs fail to comply.
Part I details the process of filing an employment discrimination
complaint, including the EEOC requirements and deadlines, and
the steps that lead from employment discrimination ultimately
to a lawsuit. Part II describes the courts' approaches to the Title
VII timing requirements-the timing involved with both filing a
charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination and filing a Title
VII lawsuit after receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.
Part III explains the implications of placing the burden on one
See US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Timeliness, online at
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
8 See Part II.A.
9 See Part I.B.
10 See, for example, Green v Union Foundry Co, 281 F3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir 2002)
("Once the defendant contests this issue, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that
he met the ninety day filing requirement.").
" FRCP 8(c) (providing the procedural rules for asserting affirmative defenses).
12 See Part III.
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party versus the other. Part IV likens the timing requirements
to statutes of limitations and discusses an analogous circuit split
that suggests how the Court might resolve the split regarding
the Title VII timing requirements.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT PROCESS
Before filing a Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit,
a complainant must first file a charge with the EEOC. 13 A
charge is a statement written under oath that details an alleged
violation of Title V11 14 and "is directed against a 'respondent'
who is either a person or an organization bound by Title VII."15
Under Title VII regulations, a charge must be "sufficiently
precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the
action or practices complained of."16 The EEOC generally
requires discrimination charges to be filed within 180 calendar
days of the alleged discrimination. 17 Alternatively, if a state or
local agency enforces a law that prohibits discrimination on the
same basis, the complainant has 300 days to file with the state
or local agency. 18
If the EEOC determines that "there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true,"19 the EEOC may initiate an
informal settlement between the parties. 20 If the EEOC
determines that it cannot facilitate a resolution between the
Is 42 USC § 2000e-5. See also Susan M. Omilian and Jean P. Kamp, 1 Sex-Based
Employment Discrimination § 12:1 (West 2013).
14 42 USC § 2000e-5.
1" Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on
"Jurisdictional" Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require That Allegations Be
Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 Geo Mason U Civ
Rts L J 213, 225 (2011).
16 29 CFR § 1601.12(b).
17 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1). See also US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Timeliness (cited in note 7).
18 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1). Some courts extend the deadline to 300 days even if the
complainant files with the EEOC rather than a state or local agency that enforces a law
prohibiting discrimination on the same basis. See, for example, Messer u Meno, 130 F3d
130, 134 (5th Cir 1997) ("A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC no more than three hundred days after learning of an adverse employment
decision in a referral state."); Messer, 130 F3d at 134 n 2 ("This court has held that 'the
requirement that persons aggrieved must initially institute proceedings with the state
referral agency is met by the EEOC's routine transmittal of a copy of the complaint to
the state referral agency."').
19 42 USC § 2000e-5(b).
20 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). See also Macfarlane, 21 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J at 228
(cited in note 15).
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parties, either because it finds that the parties will not reach an
informal settlement or because it concludes that the charge
lacks merit, it will issue the complainant notice of his or her
right to file a lawsuit, often called a "right-to-sue letter."21 In
addition, the EEOC must issue a right-to-sue letter if the
complainant requests one after 180 days have passed since filing
a charge with the commission. 22 After the EEOC issues the
complainant a right-to-sue letter, the complainant has ninety
days to file a lawsuit. 23
The complaint process differs for individuals alleging
employment discrimination claims against the federal
government.24 Each agency has an Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) office that reviews discrimination claims
from employees or job applicants. 25 A claimant must first contact
a counselor of the agency's EEO office generally within forty-five
days of the alleged discrimination. 2 6 The counselor will typically
offer the claimant an opportunity to participate in a counseling
program or in an alternative dispute resolution program, such
as mediation. 27 If the dispute is not resolved through counseling
or the alternative dispute resolution program, the claimant may
file a formal complaint with the agency's EEO office within
fifteen days of receiving instructions from the EEO office
counselor on how to file the complaint. 28 If the complaint meets
the Title VII procedural requirements, including timing, the
agency has 180 days from the date the complaint was filed to
conduct an investigation. 29
After the investigation, a complainant has two options:
"request a hearing before an EEOC [a]dministrative [j]udge or
ask the agency to issue a decision as to whether the
21 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1); Macfarlane, 21 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J at 228 (cited in
note 15).
22 42 USC §2000e-5(f)(1). See also US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Filing a Lawsuit (cited in note 6).
23 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1).
24 Timeliness, US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (cited in note 7).
21 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Overview Of Federal Sector
EEO Complaint Process, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed-employees/complaint
overview.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Overview of Federal Sector
EEO Complaint Process (cited in note 25).
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discrimination occurred."30 An agency decision can be appealed
to the EEOC or a federal district court. 31 When the
administrative judge issues his or her decision, the agency has
forty days to issue a final order, which explains whether it
agrees with the judge's decision and indicates whether it will
grant the relief ordered. 32 After receiving the final order, a
complainant has thirty days to appeal it.33 If the agency
disagrees with any part of the administrative judge's decision, it
must appeal to the EEOC. 34 If the complainant disagrees with
the EEOC's determination on appeal, he or she can request
reconsideration within thirty days of receipt of the appeals
decision. 35
A complainant must undergo the administrative complaint
process before filing a Title VII lawsuit. 36 However, the
government allows a complainant to quit the administrative
complaint process and directly file suit at several stages: (1)
after 180 days have passed from the date the complaint was
filed if the agency has not issued a decision and no appeal has
been filed; (2) within 90 days from the date of receipt of the
agency's decision on the complaint, so long as no appeal has
been filed; (3) after 180 days from the day the appeal was filed if
the EEOC has not issued a decision; or (4) within 90 days from
the date of receipt of the EEOC's decision on the appeal. 37
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHICH PARTY BEARS THE BURDEN OF
PROVING COMPLIANCE?
In Zipes v Trans World Airlines, Inc,38 the Supreme Court
held that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC
is "a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling," rather than a
30 Id.
s1 Id.
32 Id.
" The complainant appeals to the EEOC Office of Federal Operations. See US
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Overview Of Federal Sector EEO
Complaint Process (cited in note 25).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
1 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Overview of Federal Sector
EEO Complaint Process (cited in note 25).
455 US 385 (1982).
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jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.39 Nevertheless, a circuit split
has emerged regarding whether the plaintiff must prove
compliance with Title VII timing requirements or whether the
plaintiffs failure to comply with the timing requirements
provides an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove. 40
This Part examines decisions of federal courts that have
addressed the timing requirements imposed by Title VII.
Although some courts have only addressed either filing a charge
with the EEOC or filing a complaint with a district court, but
not both, the courts do not seem to distinguish their analysis for
the two filing requirements. As such, while the descriptions of
the cases below specify which filing requirement was at issue,
this Comment's analysis will not distinguish the two.
A. Plaintiff Must Prove Compliance
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and several district courts
in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits require the plaintiff to prove
that he or she complied with the Title VII timing requirements.
1. Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit has held that the burden of proving
compliance with Title VII timing requirements falls on the
plaintiff. In Montes u Vail Clinic, Inc,4 1 the Tenth Circuit
required the plaintiffs to prove that they timely filed a
workplace discrimination charge with the EEOC. 4 2 Eight former
39 Id at 393.
40 Note that the Supreme Court concluded in Zipes that the requirement, "like a
statute of limitations," is subject to "waiver," a term that is associated with affirmative
defenses and consistent with treating the timing requirement as an affirmative defense.
Id. Why the split has emerged remains unclear. The Eighth Circuit explained in Jessie v
Potter, "Bar by a statute of limitation is typically an affirmative defense, which the
defendant must plead and prove. . . . However, these principles may be misleading in a
Title VII case." The court then noted the circuit split discussed in Part II of this
Comment. 516 F3d 709, 713 n 2 (8th Cir 2008). See also Hile v Jimmy Johns Highway
55, Golden Valley, 899 F Supp 2d 843, 847 n 6 (D Minn 2012) ("The statute of limitations
is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove . . . and hence questions
regarding timeliness generally must be resolved by a motion for summary judgment
rather than a motion to dismiss. . . . Yet, it is not entirely clear that an EEOC filing
deadline should be treated like a statute of limitations-some courts have held that
compliance with such a deadline is a condition precedent to suit that must be pleaded
and proved by the plaintiff, rather than an affirmative defense on which the defendant
bears the burden.") (internal citations omitted).
41 497 F3d 1160 (10th Cir 2007).
42 Id at 1167.
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employees of Vail Clinic, Inc, sued their former employer on
Title VII grounds. 43 The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the
claims of five of the plaintiffs because they failed to establish
that they had timely filed a charge with the EEOC.44
The plaintiffs alleged that they contacted the Colorado Civil
Rights Division (CCRD) and completed an informal intake
form.45 The CCRD is a state agency that works with the EEOC
and enforces state employment discrimination laws.4 6 When a
complainant files a charge with the CCRD under a law also
enforced by the EEOC, the CCRD provides the EEOC with a
copy of the charge.4 7 However, the court questioned whether the
intake form even constituted a charge and noted that the
plaintiffs failed to provide the court with the intake form, "or
even some meaningful record evidence about [its] contents,"4 8 or
proof that it was indeed forwarded to the EEOC.4 9 The court
concluded that, even assuming the intake form qualified as a
charge with the EEOC, it "simply cannot know whether
plaintiffs 'filed' within the requisite statutory time period."50
The plaintiffs argued that the burden rested with the
defendant to furnish the intake forms and evidence of the
plaintiffs' correspondence with the CCRD because failure to
timely file a charge with the EEOC is an affirmative defense.1
41 Id at 1162.
44 Id at 1164 ("As the chart reflects, all but Ms. Escobedo, Mr. Garcia and Ms.
Montes, filed charges with the EEOC more than three hundred days after their
termination-a delay that would seemingly prove fatal to their effort to challenge the
Clinic's conduct in court.").
45 Montes, 497 F3d at 1164.
46 US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, State and Local Agencies,
online at http://www.eeoc.gov/field/phoenix/fepa.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
47 See US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fair Employment Practices
Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm
(visited Oct 18, 2014) ("When an individual initially files with a FEPA that has a
worksharing agreement with the EEOC, and the allegation is covered by a law enforced
by the EEOC, the FEPA will dual file the charge with EEOC (meaning EEOC will
receive a copy of the charge) . . . ."); Department of Regulatory Agencies, About the Civil
Rights Division, online at http://cdn.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/DORA-DCR/CBON/DORA/
1251629362218 (visited Oct 18, 2014) ("The CCRD maintains formal work-sharing
agreements with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ... to
avoid duplication of effort on those cases where joint jurisdiction (state and federal)
exists."). See also note 18 and accompanying text.
48 Montes, 497 F3d at 1165.
49 Id at 1166.
50 Id.
"1 Id at 1167.
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However, the court disagreed and "deemed compliance with
Title VII's filing deadline as a condition precedent rather than
an affirmative defense." 52 The Tenth Circuit explained that the
Supreme Court "has repeatedly described compliance with [Title
VII's] filing requirements as 'prerequisites that a plaintiff must
satisfy before filing suit,' noting as well that '[t]imely filing is a
prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action."' 53 The
court further reasoned, "Placing the burden upon plaintiffs
makes sense, too, of the practical realities at hand, for they
enjoy superior access to the evidence necessary to prove their
compliance with the statutory filing deadline."5
2. Eleventh Circuit.
Similarly, in Green v Union Foundry Co, 5 5 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant employer
after determining that the plaintiff "failed to satisfy his burden
of establishing that he filed suit" within ninety days of receiving
a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.5 6 The court noted, "The
parties agree that, in order for [the plaintiff] to maintain his
Title VII claims against [the defendant], he has the initial
burden of establishing that he filed his Complaint within ninety
days of his receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter. . . . Once the
defendant contests this issue, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that he met the ninety day filing requirement."57
The court in Green cited Jackson v Seaboard Coast Line RR
Co, 5 8 a case in which the Eleventh Circuit placed the burden on
the plaintiff to allege in his complaint that he met the conditions
precedent to filing suit.5 9 The court described the process as
follows:
[A] plaintiff must generally allege in his complaint that
all conditions precedent to the institution of the lawsuit
have been fulfilled. . . . If the defendant doubts the
52 Montes, 497 F3d at 1167.
" Id (internal citation omitted).
54 Id at 1168 (internal citations omitted).
281 F3d 1229 (11th Cir 2002).
5 See id at 1234.
1 Id at 1233-34 (internal citations omitted).
'8 678 F2d 992 (11th Cir 1982).
'9 Id at 1009-10.
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veracity of the plaintiff's allegation, in whole or in part,
then the defendant may deny specifically and with
particularity that the preconditions have not been
fulfilled.... The plaintiff then bears the burden of
proving that the conditions precedent, which the
defendant has specifically joined in issue, have been
satisfied.... If, however, the defendant does not deny the
satisfaction of the preconditions specifically and with
particularity, then the plaintiff's allegations are assumed
admitted, and the defendant cannot later assert that a
condition precedent has not been met. 0
In Jackson, the plaintiff generally averred in his complaint
that he satisfied the conditions precedent, including timely file
of a charge with the EEOC.6 1 The defendant "answered that it
was 'without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations . . . ."'62 The court concluded
that this answer sufficed as a "general denial of the averment"
but did not satisfy FRCP 9(c), which requires a "specific and
particular denial."63 Consequently, the court concluded that the
defendant waived its right to raise the claim.64 Although the
court did not specify in Jackson which party bore the burden of
proof, the court's language suggests an underlying assumption
that the burden rested with the plaintiff.65
3. Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed
the issue, but several district courts in the Fourth Circuit place
the burden on the plaintiff. In Darden v Cardinal Travel
Center,66 the court explained as follows:
In this circuit, as a settled general rule, the burden of
proving an affirmative defense is on the party asserting
it.... However, other district courts and at least one
60 Id at 1010 (quotations omitted).
61 See id.
62 Jackson, 678 F2d at 1010-11.
61 Id at 1011.
64 See id.
6" See, for example, Jackson, 678 F2d at 1010 ("The plaintiff then bears the burden
of proving that the conditions precedent ... have been satisfied.").
66 493 F Supp 2d 773 (WD Va 2007).
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court of appeals have found in Title VII cases where the
defendant contests the timeliness of the complaint that
the plaintiff holds the burden of proving that she timely
filed her claim after receiving notice from the EEOC of
her right to sue. 67
The court concluded that, given "the weight of the authority
on this question," the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
compliance with the Title VII timing requirements when the
defendant contests it.68 Darden has since been cited by other
district courts in the Fourth Circuit. 69
4. Fifth Circuit.
Several district courts in the Fifth Circuit have also ruled
that the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving that
he or she has timely filed a Title VII complaint with the court.
In Hunter-Reed v City of Houston,70 for example, the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas explained, "[D]ismissal
of a Title VII claim is proper where the plaintiff fails to establish
that the complaint was filed with the court on a timely basis."7 1
The court in Hunter-Reed cited the District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, 72 which in turn cited the Fifth
Circuit case Crawford v Western Electric Co, Inc. 73 In Crawford,
the Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs successfully
"proved that they received right-to-sue letters within 90 days of
the filing of the complaint in federal court."7 4 Although the court
did not explicitly say that the plaintiff must bear the burden, the
fact that the court discussed the plaintiffs' successful showing
(rather than the defendants' failure to prove) indicates that the
burden indeed falls on the plaintiff.
6 Id at 775-76 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
68 Id at 776.
69 See, for example, Hammonds u Bo's Food Stores, 2014 WL 3738607, *3 n 5
(EDNC May 21, 2014); Brown u Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 2010 WL 481322,
*2-3 (D Md 2010).
70 244 F Supp 2d 733 (SD Tex 2003).
71 Id at 740.
72 Smith u Flagship International, 609 F Supp 58, 61 (ND Tex 1985).
7 614 F2d 1300 (5th Cir 1980).
74 Id at 1307.
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B. Affirmative Defense: Defendant Must Show Plaintiff's
Failure to Comply
The DC, First, Ninth, and Second Circuits have placed the
burden of proving the plaintiff's failure to comply with the
timing requirements on the defendant.
1. DC Circuit.
In Colbert v Potter,75 the DC Circuit required the defendant
to prove that the plaintiff did not timely file a Title VII
lawsuit. 76 The plaintiff, an African-American female employee of
the United States Postal Service (USPS), filed a lawsuit alleging
that her supervisor discriminated against her on the basis of
race, sex, age, and disability.77
USPS filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, a motion
for summary judgment.78 In its memorandum, USPS argued
that the plaintiff failed to timely file her complaints with the
USPS EEO office and failed to file a timely complaint in the
district court.79 USPS employees alleging employment
discrimination under Title VII must file lawsuits seeking relief
within ninety days of receiving a notice of final action ("Final
Decision") taken by the USPS.8o The DC Circuit considered the
timing requirement a "statute of limitations defense" and "an
affirmative defense" under Title VII.81 The court concluded,
"Therefore, USPS 'bears the burden of pleading and proving
it."' 8 2 USPS included with its memorandum a copy of the back of
a domestic return receipt sent with the Final Decision to the
plaintiff to support its argument that the plaintiff received the
Final Decision on March 18, 2004-ninety-two days before she
7 471 F3d 158 (DC Cir 2006).
7 See id at 165.
7 See id at 160.
78 See id at 162.
79 Colbert, 471 F3d at 163.
80 42 USC § 2000e-16. See also US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Overview OfFederal Sector EEO Complaint Process (cited in note 25).
81 Colbert, 471 F3d at 165 ("[A] statute of limitations defense under Title VII is an
affirmative defense."), quoting Smith-Haynie v District of Columbia, 155 F3d 575, 577
(DC Cir 1998).
82 Colbert, 471 F3d at 165, quoting Bowden u United States, 106 F3d 433, 437 (DC
Cir 1997).
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filed suit.83 In response, the plaintiff submitted a copy of the
Final Decision, which was stamped, "Received-Mar 20 2004."84
The DC Circuit ultimately ordered USPS to file the original
domestic return receipt with the court and concluded that the
receipt, which the plaintiff's attorney signed, was mailed back to
the USPS EEO office on March 18, 2004.85 As a result, the court
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff's
complaint, filed at least ninety-two days after receiving the
Final Decision, was untimely.8 6
2. First Circuit.
The First Circuit has also treated the timing requirements
as an affirmative defense. In Mercado u Ritz-Carlton San Juan
Hotel, Spa & Casino,87 the court did not question the
defendant's assertion as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff
filed an untimely charge with the EEOC: "In its answer to
appellants' complaint, Ritz-Carlton asserted as its initial
affirmative defense that 'the claims alleged in the plaintiffs'
complaint are partially and/or totally barred by the applicable
statute of limitations and/or jurisdictional time frames.'
Although conclusory, this assertion adequately identified the
issue."88 The plaintiffs did not dispute that they filed charges
with the EEOC beyond the 300-day deadline but rather claimed
that the defendant had waived the untimeliness defense.89
Without discussing whether the plaintiff's failure to timely file a
charge is indeed an affirmative defense, the court determined
that because the defendant raised the affirmative defense "at its
first opportunity in the litigation,"90 the defense was fully
preserved, indicating that the court recognizes the plaintiff's
untimely charge as providing an affirmative defense.91
"' Colbert, 471 F3d at 163.
84 Id.
8' Id at 166-67.
86 Id at 167.
87 410 F3d 41 (1st Cir 2005).
88 See id at 45.
89 See id at 44-45.
90 Id at 45.
91 Mercado, 410 F3d at 45.
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3. Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the defendant carries
this burden. In Payan v Aramark Management Services Limited
Partnership,92 the plaintiff filed Title VII sexual discrimination
claims against Aramark Management Services. 93 Aramark filed
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was
untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after
receipt of the right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.94 In describing
the timing requirement imposed by Title VII, the Ninth Circuit
wrote, "[T]his ninety-day period operates as a limitations
period."95
The plaintiff argued that she did not know when she
received the right-to-sue letter, and defendant Aramark
responded that it was more than ninety days prior to filing
suit.96 As a result, the district court presumed that the plaintiff
received the letter three days from the issuance date on the
EEOC letter.97 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district
court erred in basing its presumption on the issuance date
without requiring Aramark to "prove the circumstances of the
mailing."98 She maintained that Aramark had the burden of
proving that the limitations period expired because its
untimeliness argument was an affirmative defense.99
The Ninth Circuit agreed but found that Aramark met its
burden:
Payan is correct that because the statute of limitations is
an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of
proving that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations
period.... Contrary to Payan's argument, however, the
defendant may do so by raising the limitations defense
92 495 F3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir 2007) ("[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving
that the plaintiff filed beyond the limitations period.").
93 See id at 1121.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 See Payan, 495 F3d at 1121-22.
97 See id at 1122.
98 Id.
99 See id.
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and providing sufficient evidence to support the
presumption. 100
The court noted that Payan could have rebutted the three-day
presumption but failed to do so. 101
4. Second Circuit.
With little explanation, the Second Circuit also concluded in
the unreported case Townsend v Home for the Homeless, Inc, 102
that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the timing
requirements is an affirmative defense. 103 The District Court for
the Northern District of New York reached the same conclusion
in Funk v F&K Supply, Inc.104
C. Summary of the Law
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as district courts
in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, have applied the timing
requirements as conditions precedent that the plaintiff must
prove that he or she has satisfied prior to filing suit. On the
other hand, the DC, First, Ninth, and Second Circuits have
determined that the plaintiff's failure to file a timely charge
with the EEOC or file a timely complaint in district court
creates an affirmative defense.
III. WHY DOES IT MATTER? THE IMPLICATIONS OF PLACING THE
BURDEN ON ONE PARTY VERSUS THE OTHER
Which party bears the burden is significant and can affect
the outcome of the litigation. If a plaintiff bears the burden, he
or she must plead compliance with the timing requirements in
the complaint. If a defendant disputes the plaintiff's compliance
with the timing requirements, the plaintiff must prove that he
'oo Payan, 495 F3d at 1122-23 (internal citations omitted).
101 See id at 1126.
102 28 Fed Appx 85 (2d Cir 2002).
'os Id at 86 ("The plaintiff asserts that even if her complaint was filed late, the
defendant waived this time-bar defense because it failed timely to plead it. The plaintiff
is correct when she argues that the 90-day time limit is an affirmative defense that is
waived if not pled.").
104 43 F Supp 2d 205, 213-14 (NDNY 1999) ("[A]s the statutory timely-filing
requirement with the EEOC functions as a statute of limitations . . . it follows that the
defense is waived if not set forth in the responsive pleading.") (internal citation omitted).
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or she filed a charge with the EEOC and filed a claim in the
district court on time. For example, when the defendant in
Montes105 challenged whether the plaintiff complied with the
Title VII timing requirements, the court required the plaintiff to
demonstrate compliance by providing the court with evidence of
her communications with the state's equal employment
opportunity office. 106 Thus, if the burden falls on the plaintiff,
the defendant has an incentive to contest the plaintiff's
compliance with the timing requirements, even if the defendant
thinks the plaintiff likely complied. The challenge would raise
the cost of litigation for the plaintiff, given he would have to
prove compliance, and in the event the plaintiff did fail to
comply, it would lead to dismissal of his complaint.
On the other hand, when the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the timing requirements provides an affirmative defense,
the defendant must raise the defense in his responsive
pleading.107 In order to successfully prevail on this defense, the
defendant must furnish proof-for example, by providing the
court with evidence showing the dates of the alleged
discrimination or with a receipt showing when the plaintiff filed
a charge with the EEOC.108 However, the defendant's failure to
include this affirmative defense in the responsive pleading
generally constitutes waiver of the defense, 10 and "[c]ourts
generally lack the ability to raise an affirmative defense sua
sponte." 110
For example, in Roe v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 111 the Seventh
Circuit refused to allow the defendant to proceed on a statute-of-
limitations defense:
105 See Part II.A. 1.
106 Montes, 497 F3d at 1167.
107 See FCRP 8(c).
108 See, for example, Colbert, 471 F3d at 163-65.
109 See Perry v Sullivan, 207 F3d 379, 382 (7th Cir 2000) ("Case law holding that
limitations and other affirmative defenses must be filed with the defendant's response
are legion."). See also Charles Alan Wright, et al, 5 Federal Practice Procedure § 1278
(West 3d ed 2013) ("It is a frequently stated proposition of virtually universal acceptance
by the federal courts that a failure to plead an affirmative defense as required by Federal
Rule 8(c) results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case. . . .").
n0 Hutcherson v Lauderdale County, 326 F3d 747, 757 (6th Cir 2003). See also
Wright, et al, 5 Federal Practice Procedure at § 1278 (cited in note 109) ("Several courts
of appeals have held that the district court may dismiss a claim sua sponte based on an
affirmative defense ... as long as the defendant has not waived the defense.") (internal
citations omitted).
n1 132 F2d 829 (7th Cir 1943).
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment was not made
until after it had filed its answer. . . . When defendant
moved for summary judgment it had filed an answer, the
legal effect of which was a waiver of its defense of the
statute of limitations. It could not, therefore, unless
relieved from its default, revive the defense it had
waived. 112
Moreover, in Funk,1 13 the plaintiff filed a charge more than
300 days after the alleged most recent unlawful employment
practice, and she thus failed to meet the requirements of Title
VII.114 Nevertheless, the court did not dismiss her complaint.
After determining that the timing requirement operated as an
affirmative defense, the court explained, "[t]he defense is waived
if not set forth in the responsive pleading.... As defendants did
not affirmatively plead that [the plaintiff] failed to file a timely
administrative charge with the EEOC, they have waived this
defense."115 If, however, the burden were placed on the plaintiff
in Funk, she would have been unable to prove she filed a timely
charge (given that she did not file in time), and as a result, the
court would likely have dismissed her complaint.
As such, placing the burden on the defendant rather than
the plaintiff can have significant repercussions from the
defendant's perspective. It may be worthwhile for defendants to
verify early in the litigation process that the plaintiff timely
filed a charge and complaint (given that the plaintiff's failure to
comply would likely lead to dismissal, saving the defendant
various costs associated with litigation), regardless of which
party has the burden.116 However, defendants essentially must
do so early in the litigation process (namely, before filing an
answer 117) in jurisdictions in which failure to comply with the
timing requirements provides an affirmative defense.
112 Id at 832.
in 43 F Supp 2d at 205.
114 Id at 213.
n. Id at 213-14.
n1 In jurisdictions in which the plaintiff bears the burden, it would be wise for
defendants to always challenge the plaintiffs compliance with the timing requirements.
This forces the plaintiff to expend resources to prove compliance or, alternatively, would
lead to early dismissal if the plaintiff cannot prove compliance.
117 See FRCP 12(a)-(b) (describing when and how to present defenses); 8(c)
(explaining that a party must affirmatively state an affirmative defense in a responsive
pleading).
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Otherwise, defendants risk waiving the defense and answering
to litigation that fails to meet the requirements of Title VII.
IV. RESOLVING THE SPLIT: GUIDANCE FROM OTHER AREAS OF
THE LAW
A. Statutes of Limitations
In circuits in which Title VII timing requirements provide
the defendant with an affirmative defense, the deadlines to file a
charge with the EEOC and a complaint with the district court
essentially operate as statutes of limitations. This Section
argues that the Title VII timing requirements should be treated
as statutes of limitations and hence that the defendant should
bear the burden of proving the plaintiff's failure to comply.
1. Purpose.
The Supreme Court has explained that statutes of
limitations generally aim "to protect defendants against stale or
unduly delayed claims,"11 8 "to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on
their rights,"119 and to make defendants aware of any claims
against them and of the need to preserve evidence and locate
witnesses. 120 The Court has characterized statutes of limitations
as striking a balance between what "the legislature deems a
reasonable time [for plaintiffs] to present their claims" 121 and
protection for "defendants and the courts from having to deal
with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
documents, or otherwise." 122 Further, the Court stated in
Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc,123 "Although any
statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the
period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of
118 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co u United States, 552 US 130, 133 (2008).
119 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co, Inc u Parker, 462 US 345, 352 (1983).
120 See id at 353.
121 US u Kubrick, 444 US 111, 117 (1979).
122 Id.
123 421 US 454 (1975).
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protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones." 124
The legislative history regarding the Title VII timing
requirements is sparse. 125 In determining how to apply the Title
VII filing deadlines before Zipes, the Fifth Circuit in Coke u
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc12 6 turned to the Congressional
Record:
With respect to Title VII, we note the remarks of Senator
Humphrey characterizing the time period for filing a
claim as a "period of limitations" (110 Cong Rec 12723)
and the statement of Senator Case that the purpose of
the time period is to prevent the pressing of "stale" claims
(110 Cong Rec 7243), an end usually associated with a
statute of limitations. These comments do suggest that
Congress intended the time period to operate like a
statute of limitations. 127
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded in Delaware State
College u Ricks 128 that the Title VII limitations period, "while
guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who
promptly assert their rights, also protect[s] employers from the
burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions
that are long past."12 9 The Court concluded in Zipes, "By holding
compliance with the filing period to be . . . a requirement subject
to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor
the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without
negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give
prompt notice to the employer." 130
124 Id at 463-64.
121 Zipes, 455 US at 394. See also Coke v General Adjustment Bureau, Inc, 640 F2d
584, 593 (5th Cir 1981).
126 640 F2d 584 (5th Cir 1981). Note that this case was before the Supreme Court
held in Zipes that the timing requirements were not jurisdictional prerequisites. Thus, in
Coke, the Fifth Circuit was contrasting statute of limitations from jurisdictional
prerequisites and not addressing the split discussed in this Comment. See Coke, 640 F2d
at 593. Still, the court's references to the legislative history of Title VII and its
interpretation thereof prove telling of the senators' intentions when passing the law.
127 Id at 593.
128 449 US 250 (1980).
129 Id at 256-57.
"s Zipes, 455 US at 398.
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Therefore, both statutes of limitations generally and Title
VII timing requirements specifically seek to give plaintiffs
adequate time to pursue their claims and ensure defendants
have prompt notice of claims against them. They also both aim
to prevent the prosecution of stale claims, the evidence for which
may be difficult to obtain due to the time between the occurrence
giving rise to the claim and the suit itself.
2. Burden of proof.
FRCP 8(c) states that in a responsive pleading, a party
must affirmatively state a defense based on the statute of
limitations. 131 In addition, the Supreme Court said, "[T]he law
typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense
that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and that is
subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver." 132 The defendant bears
the burden of proving an affirmative defense, the assertion of
which, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's claim even if the
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are true. 133
The only explanation courts typically provide for placing the
burden of proof on a particular party is that the party on whom
the burden falls benefits when the burden of proof is met. For
example, the US Tax Court explained, "The statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense and the burden of proving
that the period has expired is on the party seeking to avail
himself of its benefit." 134 Furthermore, in determining whether
the statute of limitations from another state applied in the
diversity case Hart u Bates, 135 the Eastern District of New York
cited the 1990 Practice Commentary to Section 202 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules: 136
It has been held ... that when a party seeks to wrap
himself in the protection of a foreign statute of
limitations, that party, whether he is plaintiff or
.s. FRCP 8(c). See also Wyshak v City National Bank, 607 F2d 824, 827 (9th Cir
1979).
132 John R. Sand & Grauvel Co, 552 US at 133.
ls "Defense," Black's Law Dictionary (West 9th ed 2009).
114 Watt u Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 51 Tax Ct Mem (CCH) 293, 6-7 (1986).
ls. 897 F Supp 710, 712-13 (EDNY 1995).
116 NY CPLR § 202 (McKinney 1990).
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defendant, bears the burden of proving that he is entitled
to the benefit of the foreign statute of limitations. 137
Therefore, which party benefits from a successful showing is
significant in courts' determination of which party should bear
that burden. This is also consistent with the burden-shifting
framework in statute-of-limitation defenses: When the
defendant has shown that the limitations period has run, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that he is entitled to an
exception to the statute of limitations.138 If the plaintiff
successfully establishes an exception, his complaint will not be
dismissed for exceeding the statute of limitations, and he thus
benefits from the exception to the limitations period.
Placing the burden of showing that the plaintiff failed to
comply with Title VII timing requirements on the defendant is
similarly reasonable and appropriate. The limitations period
shares the same purpose as statutes of limitations and in many
jurisdictions operates as a statute of limitations. 139 Just as in a
case where the claim is time-barred by the statute of limitations,
the defendant in a Title VII suit is the party that benefits from a
showing of the plaintiffs failure to comply with the timing
requirements imposed by Title VII. 140
3. Access to proof.
The Tenth Circuit in Montes141 noted that plaintiffs have
greater access to proof demonstrating that they complied with
the Title VII timing requirements, a justification the court
provided for placing the burden on the plaintiff. 142 Specifically,
the plaintiff should have copies of the charge filed with the
EEOC and the right-to-sue letter and should know on which
dates the alleged discrimination occurred. However, plaintiffs
have greater access to proof in other legal contexts for which the
1s7 Hart, 897 F Supp at 712 n 5.
"ss See Campbell v Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co, 238 F3d 772, 775 (6th Cir
2001).
19 See Part I.B.
140 See Wollman v Gross, 637 F2d 544, 549 (8th Cir 1980).
141 497 F3d at 1160. See also Part II.A. 1.
142 See Montes, 497 F3d at 1168 ("Placing the burden upon plaintiffs makes sense,
too, of the practical realities at hand, for they enjoy superior access to the evidence
necessary to prove their compliance with the statutory filing deadline, here their own
letter and completed state forms.") (internal citations omitted).
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statutes of limitations place the burden of proof on defendants.
Addressing this, the Supreme Court concluded in Taylor v
Sturgell,14 3 "Very often one must plead and prove matters as to
which his adversary has superior access to the proof. In these
situations, targeted interrogatories or deposition questions can
reduce the information disparity."144 In Taylor, the Court
declined to place the burden of establishing claim preclusion on
the plaintiff because claim preclusion is an affirmative
defense. 145 Thus, despite the fact that "direct evidence justifying
nonparty preclusion is often in the hands of plaintiffs rather
than defendants," the Court found it more significant that claim
preclusion was an affirmative defense that did not warrant the
creation of an exception to the general rule that the defendant
plead and prove such a defense. 14 6
Similarly, in a Title VII suit, plaintiffs may have greater
access than defendants to the dates on which they filed a charge
with the EEOC and a complaint in a district court. However, the
disparity of information between the parties regarding Title VII
filing dates is not great, as Title VII instructs the EEOC to
notify the employer against whom a charge is filed. First, the
EEOC must provide notice to the person/employer against whom
a charge is filed within ten days of its filing. 147 In addition, the
statute enumerates other details that the EEOC must disclose
to the employer, including "the date, place and circumstances of
the alleged unlawful employment practice."14 8 Further, if the
proceeding was initially instituted with a state or local agency
that has the authority to seek relief or to pursue criminal
proceedings, the EEOC must provide the state or local agency
with a copy of the charge. 14 9
These administrative procedures help to ensure that the
employer has enough information to support a showing that the
plaintiff failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC or, at the
very least, reduce the disparity between the parties sufficiently
such that the defendant can find the information needed to
143 553 US 880 (2008).
144 Id at 907 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
141 Id at 906-07.
146 Id at 907.
147 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1).
148 42 USC § 20003-5(e)(1).
149 42 USC § 20003-5(e)(1). See also notes 18 and 47 and accompanying text.
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support the affirmative defense, for example, by contacting the
EEOC. Thus, the information disparity regarding the dates on
which the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC and the suit in
court is not, standing alone, sufficient to justify placing the
burden on the plaintiff to prove compliance with Title VII's
timing requirements, which the Supreme Court has analogized
to a statute of limitations. 150
Furthermore, defendants in Title VII cases, especially large
corporations and government agencies that have previously
encountered Title VII suits, are likely to keep better records
than plaintiffs, particularly those who have not filed Title VII
lawsuits before. As an EEOC charge and potential Title VII suit
emerges, defendants are more likely to have legal counsel
available for consultation, and legal counsel can advise
defendants to keep track of any relevant dates and
documentation thereof. The plaintiff, on the other hand, may file
a charge with the EEOC before seeking legal counsel and may
not have the means to learn of the relevant dates and legal
process as early in the litigation.
B. Guidance from the Prison Litigation Reform Act
In 2007, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split parallel
to the Title VII timing requirements when it determined
whether exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA)15 1 is "a pleading requirement the prisoner must
satisfy in his complaint or an affirmative defense the defendant
must plead and prove." 152 The PLRA requires prisoners to
exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing a lawsuit
regarding prison conditions or alleging civil rights violations:
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under [42 USC § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 153
The Court in Jones v Bock 154 held that a plaintiff need not
plead exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA in
"s See Zipes, 455 US at 388-93.
..' Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996), codified at 42 USC § 1997e.
112 Jones u Bock, 549 US 199, 204 (2007).
..s 42 USC § 1997e(a).
114 549 US 199 (2007).
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his complaint; rather, the failure to exhaust said remedies is an
affirmative defense.1S Prior to the Court's decision, the Sixth
Circuit had held that the burden of proving exhaustion under
the PLRA fell on the plaintiff, 156 while most circuits had held
that it was an affirmative defense.157
Although the purpose of the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement-"to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits"158-differs from that of Title VII's timing
requirements,1 59 the reasoning of the Jones Court can provide
guidance for a resolution to the split regarding Title VII timing
requirements. In Jones, the Court provided the following
reasoning for overturning the Sixth Circuit's decision and
holding that the failure to exhaust prison grievance procedures
is an affirmative defense:
We think that the PLRA's screening requirement does
not-explicitly or implicitly-justify deviating from the
usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified
by the PLRA itself ... Although exhaustion was a
"centerpiece" of the PLRA, . . . failure to exhaust was
notably not added in terms to this enumeration. There is
thus no reason to suppose that the normal pleading rules
have to be altered to facilitate judicial screening of
complaints specifically for failure to exhaust. 160
Thus, the Supreme Court found it significant that the PLRA
did not address failure to exhaust. In addition, when the Fourth
Circuit held that the failure to exhaust under the PLRA was an
affirmative defense, the court turned to the "language and
structure" of the PLRA.161 The Ninth Circuit also held that the
1.. Id at 200.
116 Id at 204-05. See also Brown v Toombs, 139 F3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir 1998)
("[T]his court will henceforth require that prisoners filing § 1983 cases involving prison
conditions must allege and show that they have exhausted all available state
administrative remedies.").
117 See Jones, 549 US at 204 n 2. See also Anderson v XYZ Correctional Health
Services, Inc, 407 F3d 674, 681 (4th Cir 2005); Wyatt v Terhune, 315 F3d 1108, 1119 (9th
Cir 2003); Massey v Helman, 196 F3d 727, 735 (7th Cir 1999).
1s Porter u Nussle, 534 US 516, 516-17 (2002).
19 See Part IV.A.
160 Jones, 549 US at 214 (internal citations omitted).
161 Anderson, 407 F3d at 681 ("In our view, the language and structure of the PLRA
make it clear that an inmate is not required to allege exhaustion of remedies in his
§ 1983 prison-conditions complaint. Instead, an inmate's failure to exhaust his
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exhaustion requirement creates an affirmative defense, adding,
"Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently affirmed, we will not
impose heightened pleading requirements where Congress has
not expressly instructed us to do so." 162
Both the Title VII filing time requirements and the PLRA
exhaustion requirements impose duties the plaintiff must fulfill
before he or she is able to file a suit in court. If raised as an
affirmative defense, both could result in dismissal of the
corresponding suit. Furthermore, Title VII details the process
through which a complainant must file a charge and complaint
and with which the EEOC must comply. However, just as the
PLRA does not explicitly address the procedure involved when a
plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies, Title VII does
not explicitly address the procedure involved when the plaintiff
fails to comply with the timing requirements. 163 As such, the
Court's reasoning in Jones is applicable to the Title VII timing
circuit split. 164 As Jones suggests, where Congress does not
specify a departure from the ordinary procedural rules, the
courts should not create one. 165 Because of the significant
similarities between the two requirements, the reasoning in
Jones fortifies the argument that the Title VII timing
requirements should create an affirmative defense when
plaintiffs fail to comply.
V. CONCLUSION
The strict deadlines imposed by Title VII can have a
significant impact on the outcome of employment discrimination
cases, and failure to comply with them can result in dismissal of
the suit. 166 The timing requirements are limitations periods that
serve to prevent stale claims, provide defendants with notice of
administrative remedies must be viewed as an affirmative defense that should be
pleaded or otherwise properly raised by the defendant.").
162 Wyatt, 315 F3d at 1118.
1s See 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1).
164 See, for example, Perez u Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 182 F3d 532, 535-
36 (7th Cir 1999) (likening the exhaustion requirements under PLRA to statutes of
limitations, noting that "[d]efendants may waive or forfeit reliance on § 1997e(a), just as
they may waive or forfeit the benefit of a statute of limitations").
16 See note 160 and accompanying text.
166 See, for example, Colbert, 471 F3d at 167 (affirming summary judgment for the
defendant after finding the plaintiff filed her complaint two days late); Dougherty v
Barry, 869 F2d 605, 615 (DC Cir 1989) ("Appellees' Title VII action was untimely filed
and should be dismissed.").
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the claims against them, and ensure the preservation of relevant
evidence and witnesses, and accordingly, their purpose and
operation mirror those of statutes of limitations. Any potential
for the plaintiff to have greater access to proof is not unique to
the timing requirements, and as with statutes of limitations, the
Title VII timing requirements should create an affirmative
defense when plaintiffs fail to comply. In resolving this circuit
split, courts can further look to the Supreme Court's approach to
resolving the circuit split regarding the exhaustion of remedies
under the PLRA.

